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“Are We Working Too Hard or Should We Be Working
Harder? A Simple Model of Career Concerns.” Andrew
Foerster and Leonardo Martinez, Federal Reserve Bank of
Richmond Economic Quarterly, Winter 2006, vol. 92, no. 1,
pp. 79-91.
F
or the most part, workers decide for themselves how
hard to work. In many cases, it’s a safe bet that they
are motivated by their career aspirations. Employees
interested in promotions, raises, or new opportunities
would, it is presumed, want to enhance their 
reputations. In general, employees can best accomplish
this by exerting effort on the job — working harder.
Take the example of a salesperson who is trying to
decide whether to work an extra hour. He knows that his
future compensation depends on his perceived ability.
He can deduce that by working one extra hour, and by
extension selling one extra widget, his employer will judge
him a more able employee and pay him handsomely.
This might be comforting to business owners who
would like their employees to exert effort as if they
owned the firm. But are career incentives really enough
to accomplish this?
In a new article, Richmond Fed economists Andrew
Foerster and Leonardo Martinez investigate the power of
career incentives. The authors developed a simple mathe-
matical model that seeks to replicate interactions between
workers and the job market. In particular, their model
examines whether career-concern incentives can, all 
by themselves, properly motivate employees to make
“socially efficient” decisions about how hard to work, or to
work as hard as they would work if they owned the firm.
The answer is no.
Here’s the problem: Workers don’t consider the produc-
tivity of their effort (or how much their work will benefit
society, or even their firm) when deciding whether to 
ratchet up or down effort. Employees exert extra effort
based on the expected change in their future compensation.
If employees think their compensation is particularly
sensitive to their reputation, they may work too hard,
overshooting the “socially efficient” effort level. On the
flip side, if employees don’t think their reputations 
matter, then they won’t work hard enough to meet the
socially efficient level.
“Career concerns do not necessarily lead to socially
efficient decisions by the employee,” the authors write.
“Getting employees to make socially efficient decisions
would require additional incentives beyond those 
created by career concerns.”
“Retail Deposit Fees and Multimarket Banking.” Timothy H.
Hannan, Federal Reserve Board of Governors Finance 
and Economics Discussion Series Paper 2005-65, 
December 2005.
A
s anyone who’s tried to withdraw cash from an 
unfamiliar ATM can attest, banks in recent years have
made fees a key part of their revenue stream. Now comes
one of the first studies to compare some of the most 
common fees and then figure out which kinds of banks in
which kinds of locations tend to charge the most.
In the article, Fed economist Timothy H. Hannan looks
at six common fees, including those for checks drawn on
insufficient funds, for stop payments on checks, and for
using another institution’s ATM. What he finds won’t thrill
many banking customers: the bigger the bank — specifically,
those with a presence in more than one market — the
greater the likelihood of “substantially higher” fees. 
Moreover, banks in highly concentrated markets tend to
charge the highest fees. This means that in regions with
many banks, even smaller banks hike up their fees — even as
they tend to keep lower fees on average when left alone. The
author notes an “interesting exception” to this finding, 
however: Small banks tend to charge lower fees to account
holders who withdraw cash from other banks’ ATMs, in an
effort to keep depositors from switching to a competitor.
“Why are Immigrants’ Incarceration Rates So Low? Evidence
on Selective Immigration, Deterrence, and Deportation.”
Kristin F. Butcher and Anne Morrison Piehl, Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago Working Paper 2005-19, November 2005.
I
mmigrants to the United States share many characteristics
with this nation’s population of prisoners: They tend 
to have low average levels of education, low wages, and
generally are young and male. But despite economic theo-
ries which seem to support a link between immigration
and crime, the authors find evidence that immigrants have
“very low rates of institutionalization compared to the
native born.” In fact, immigrant incarceration rates have
dramatically fallen over the past few decades, standing in
2000 at one-fifth the rate of comparable native-born
Americans.
The authors rule out increased deportation as driving
the trend. Instead, they argue that immigrants are 
“self-selected from among those with lower criminal
propensities.” The upshot, the authors suggest, is that 
policymakers ought to view with skepticism sweeping 
generalizations of immigrants as criminally inclined. RF
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